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Reducing Asymmetric Information in Venture Capital 
Backed IPOs 
 
(Managerial Finance, Forthcoming) 
 
 
Diego Escobari † Alejandro Serrano ‡ 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to model asymmetric information and study the profitability of venture capital 
(VC) backed initial public offerings (IPOs). Our mixtures approach endogenously separates IPOs into differentiated 
groups based on their returns’ determinants. We also analyze the factors that affect the probability that IPOs belong 
to a specific group. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – We propose a new method to model asymmetric information between investors 
and firms in VC backed IPOs. Our approach allows us to identify differentiated companies under incomplete 
information. We use a sample of 2,404 U.S. firms from 1980 through 2012 to estimate our mixture model via 
maximum likelihood. 
 
Findings – We find strong evidence that companies can be separated into two groups based on how IPO returns are 
determined. For companies in the first group the results are similar to previous studies. For companies in the second 
group we find that profitability is mainly affected by the reputation of the seed VC and capital expenditures. Tangible 
assets and age help explain group affiliation. We also motivate our findings for a continuum of heterogeneous IPO 
groups. 
 
Practical implications – The proposed mixture approach helps decrease asymmetric information for investors, 
regulators, and companies. 
 
Originality/value – Our mixture methods help decrease asymmetric information between investors and firms 
improving the probability of making profitable investments. Separating between groups of IPOs is crucial because 
different determinants of an IPO operating performance can potentially have opposite effects for different groups. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a significant amount of interest in newly issued stocks. The underpricing of Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) has been well documented as well as their long run underperformance. For the 
investor, it would certainly be profitable to obtain as much information as possible on the company that 
is going public before the IPO date. One category of private companies that have useful information to 
potential investors is IPOs backed by venture capitalists (VCs). Knowing a company’s funding VC can be 
instrumental in making a profitable investment.  
In conjunction with analyzing the firm’s information contained in the documents that the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires prior to an IPO, such as the S-1, we propose a new 
methodology to reduce existing asymmetric information between firms and investors. We study the 
profitability of venture capital backed IPOs where IPOs are endogenously separated into differentiated 
groups based on how their returns are determined. Moreover we also analyze the determinants of the 
probability that IPOs belongs to a specific group. Identifying differentiated companies that will go public 
can help investors determine the usefulness and impact that public information has on profitability. We 
use variables that have been previously analyzed in the VC literature (Gompers, 1995; Tian, 2011) to 
categorize VC backed IPOs. The mixture methods we propose allow us to identify differentiated 
companies even under incomplete information on their characteristics.  
Our proposed methods are a good fit to the venture capitalist industry given the existence of 
asymmetric information between the entrepreneur and the financier. The venture capitalist only has 
access to a limited number of observable characteristics that will have a marginal impact on the 
variables that define the profitability of a company. Furthermore, for other investors that want to 
partake in the IPO, the investment selection becomes easier. After the investor identifies the group 
affiliation of each IPO, he can then rely on the reputation of the VC to decide in which IPO to invest. If 
the investor understands that a reputable VC cherry picks the companies and provides managerial and 
consulting know how, then by relying on the quality of the VC the investor can participate in an IPO with 
a higher probability of success. 
The mixture methods we employ work in the presence of incomplete information and allow 
separating companies based on the role of their profitability determinants. The separation is based on 
the VCs capabilities in scrutinizing private information. If a VC is skeptical, then a company will receive 
more capital rounds than a company that is perceived as promising. Because more capital rounds 
translate into a less profitable long term performance, it is in the interest of investors to estimate the 
unobserved characteristics of the company prior to investing in them. 
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One key benefit of using our proposed mixture specification is that we can model unobserved 
heterogeneity of VC backed IPOs. Our approach endogenously separates the companies into groups 
based on limited information about the company. Following the previous literature (Gompers, 1995; 
Tian, 2011), we compute industry averages based on tangibility of assets, research and development, 
and market to book value of equity. We find that the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total 
assets is the main indicator that determines the group affiliation of each company. This separation is 
crucial because variables that were previously considered as determinants of an IPO operating 
performance can potentially have opposite effects once heterogeneity across groups is accounted for.  
The maximum likelihood estimates of our model find strong evidence supporting the existence of 
differentiated groups of companies. We find that the results for type- companies are similar to 
previous studies, i.e., capital rounds have a negative effect on profitability. Moreover, syndication and 
market value at IPO also have negative effects on Return on Assets (ROA). The factors that have a 
positive effect on performance are the length of the financing process prior to the IPO, the reputation of 
the seed VC, and the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. For type- companies we find that 
profitability is mostly affected by the reputation of the seed VC and capital expenditures. The reputation 
of the VC is positively associated to ROA with a marginal effect on ROA that is about three times the 
magnitude estimated for type- companies. Interestingly, the ratio of capital expenditures to assets 
operates in the opposite direction for different company types and its magnitude is about ten times 
larger for type-. This ratio of capital expenditures has been rarely analyzed in previous literature 
because it was found to be either not statistically significant or with a relatively small marginal effect on 
ROA. However, our results suggest that capital expenditures have a highly statistically significant effect 
on returns of the VC backed IPOs. We argue that previous literature that failed to model differentiated 
groups of companies and pooled all companies into a single group missed the significance of the effect. 
For the investor interested in IPOs, there is a high degree of risk given the lack of historical data on 
these companies. However, our proposed methods give evidence that for VC backed IPOs there is a 
group of companies that will be strongly and positively influenced by the reputation of the seed VC. For 
this same group, a high ratio of capital expenditures to total assets on the year of the IPO can decrease 
the operating performance. The seed VC is information available to all investors through the S-1 form 
and the reputation of the seed VC can be determined through several measures. Our definition of VC 
reputation comes from Nahata (2008) that looks at the participation of the VC on the IPO market by 
computing the ratio of the VC investments to the total amount of VC backed IPOs in a particular year.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2717453
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of venture capital and IPOs. 
Section 3 describes the data while section 4 explains the empirical approach. Section 5 presents and 
discusses the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Discussion of the Interaction between Venture Capital and IPOs 
A key element for venture capitalists is the IPO and one of the most studied elements in IPOs has been 
its underpricing. Ibbotson (1975), Ritter (1987), and Loughran and Ritter (2004) have documented IPO 
underpricing in the United States. After the initial euphoria that results from the underpricing discount, 
these investments have long run average returns (Boyer, 2004; Loughran and Ritter, 1995).  Long term 
stockholders should also be concerned with the post-issue operating performance. Jain and Kini (1994) 
document a decline in operating return on assets despite an increase in sales and capital expenditures. 
Jain and Kini (1995) compare the operating performance of VC backed IPOs to non VC IPOs. They find 
that VC backed IPOs perform better than the remaining IPOs in terms of operating returns on assets. 
They argue that these results are due to better monitoring by the VC before and after the IPO. 
The behavior of the VC is designed not only to reduce the adverse selection problem but it is also 
motivated to improve its reputation on the market. Nahata (2008) shows that VCs with a strong 
reputation have a positive effect on a company’s asset productivity at their IPOs. Krishnan, Ivanov, 
Masulis, and Singh (2011) find similar effects on the long term performance. 
Sørensen (2007) states that experienced VCs are better at sorting promising entrepreneurs and their 
advising further enhances the profitability of the entrepreneur. If more experienced VCs can select the 
most promising companies, then the performance of these companies strengthens the reputation of the 
VC regardless of the advising. Endogeneity arises because an experienced VC can judge a company 
better than a young VC and this is reflected in the company’s future profitability. This phenomenon can 
be observed in our results where one of the two main characteristics that affect a company’s 
performance is the reputation of the seed VC.  Other relevant participant in the IPO process is the 
underwriter. Yip, Su, and Ang (2009) find that the underwriter’s reputation has a strong influence in the 
performance of an IPO. If a VC backed IPO is underwritten by a leading investment bank, investors earn 
above market returns in the long run. Jones and Swaleheen (2010) find that underwriter’s reputation is 
positively related to short term returns. 
VCs allocate capital based on their estimation of an entrepreneur’s future profitability. These capital 
allocation decisions are made under uncertainty and with limited information on the characteristics of 
the company. When looking at the VCs decisions to invest we have that, for example, based on a survey 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2717453
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by Kaplan and Strömberg (2004), management quality is cited by 60% of the respondents, good 
performance by 27%, large and growing markets by 69%, and competitiveness and likelihood of 
customer adoption by 30%. This information is not observed and it is still largely uncertain during the 
first year after the IPO. We expect our mixtures approach to capture part of this information.  
Our approach to analyze VC backed IPOs is new as we exploit recent developments in mixture 
models (see, e.g., Gan and Hernandez, 2013).  Simpler mixture structures were used in Lee and Porter 
(1984) to separate firms into cooperating and non-cooperating with a railroad cartel during the 1880s. 
Gan and Mosquera (2008) study credit card consumers and estimate the probability that consumers 
belong to a group that is more credit worthy. In the insurance industry companies are concerned with 
the pricing of policies based on individuals' heterogeneous risk preferences. Interestingly, individuals 
have private information with regards to their own risk that creates a problem of adverse selection to 
insurance companies. Gan, Huang, and Mayer (2011) use mixtures and divide individuals into two types. 
One group prefers insurance and is less likely to suffer an accident whereas the other group dislikes 
insurance and is more likely to experience an accident.  
 
3. Data 
Our main source of data comes from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Global New Issues database. 
We use IPOs backed by venture capital firms that became public between January 1, 1980 and August 1, 
2012. We exclude foreign issues, IPOs with an offer price less than $5, utilities (SIC code between 4900 
and 4999), finance (SIC code between 6000 and 6999), and spin-offs. We also remove firms with missing 
venture capital information or round information. Accounting information such as assets, book value of 
equity, research and development, net income, capital expenditures, and property, plant and equipment 
is from Compustat. Market value information on the IPO date is from CRSP and the founding date is 
from Jay Ritter’s database (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). The final sample has 2,404 IPOs. 
We are concerned with understanding what variables affect the profitability of firms. The main 
dependent variable is Return on Assets () measured as net income including extraordinary items 
divided by total assets on the year of the IPO. For robustness, we also compute Returns on Equity () 
which equals net income including extraordinary items divided by total book value of equity. Additional 
variables in the model include the number of capital rounds (	
) that the entrepreneur receives 
before going public and the number of venture capitalists (
) that participate in the IPO process. 
Moreover,  indicates the number of years between the year when the company receives the 
first capital round until the year of the IPO. The ratio /


 equals the company’s capital 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2717453
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expenditures divided by its total assets on the year of the IPO. Following Nahata (2008)'s measure for VC 
reputation (	), we construct a measure of the rating of the VC. That is, we compute the 
capitalization share of the VC as the market value of all companies taken public by the seed VC from 
1980 until the year of the first round and then divide this by the aggregate market value of all VC backed 
IPOs for the same period. If the VC had no IPOs on the year of the first capital round, we use the closest 
aggregate IPO value within a 3 year window. If there are still no IPOs backed by the VC in this window, 
we use the average VC capitalization share during the year of the first round. Finally, if there is more 
than one seed VC, we keep the highest capitalization share. We also use Market Value () defined as 
the closing price times the number of shares outstanding on the day of the IPO.  
Additional variables include the number of years between the founding year and the year of the first 
venture capital round (1	) and the amount of money given in the first round (
	). 
We also include annual industry average ratios for three variables. The average industry market-to-book 
ratio (	
	) measured as the market value of equity divided by book value of equity, the 
average industry research and development to total assets (	
	& ), and the average ratio of 
property, plant and equipment to total assets ( 	
	!! ). We follow Gompers (1995)'s 
methodology to obtain the industry ratios. That is, we compute the mean average industry ratio across 
all years when venture capital rounds take place. For each ratio we compute the average of all 
companies in Compustat for that particular year with the same four digit SIC. If there are not at least 4 
companies with the same 4 digit code we look at companies with the same 3 digit and even 2 digit SIC. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. The mean  and  tell a similar story of VC backed 
IPOs that have a negative profitability on the first year. However, for both profitability measures the 
standard deviation is approximately three times the mean. The range of observations is even wider for 
 where the minimum value is -7.658 and the maximum value is 0.584. For , the range is only 
1.911 going from a minimum of -1.552 to a maximum of 0.359. The number of venture capital rounds 
before an IPO is 4.879, going from 1 round to 24 rounds. The number of venture capitalists that 
participate on an IPO is 6.34. The difference between the number of rounds and the number of venture 
capitalists that participate in an IPO show that the process can be very different for some firms. The 
incubation process takes an average of 4.46 years and its standard deviation is 3.53. Our sample also 
shows that there are 10 companies that spent more than 20 years in the process.  The measure of VC 
reputation suggested by Nahata (2008) is the VC capitalization ratio and its standard deviation is almost 
twice the average. The minimum and the maximum indicate a wide variety of venture capitalist firms 
trying to take companies public. The market value of firms also shows a wide spectrum of firms going 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2717453
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public. The mean market value of an IPO is more than $400 million and its standard deviation is almost 
three times larger. Capital expenditures show the amount invested in improving or acquiring tangible 
assets which serves to ameliorate the asymmetry of information between the entrepreneur and the 
financier. This is because the financier can keep the physical assets in the case of liquidation. The 
average capital expenditures over assets is .074 with a standard deviation barely above this level. 
 
[Table 1, here] 
 
The mean of 1	 indicates that there is an average of 4.86 years between founding and 
the first round of VC capital. The range is 113 years, which tells us that some companies have acquired 
significant reputation (as measured in years) to decrease the information asymmetry but some VCs may 
invest in premature companies where the asymmetry can be very large. 
	 equals the 
amount of money received at the first round. There is also a very wide range of values for these 
companies. 	
	 is the average market to book value of equity. Some companies have a 
relatively low book value which creates a relatively wide range for this variable. We also observe in the 
sample that for 70 companies the market value is ten times larger than its book value of equity. The 
average industry research and development expense has an impact on the number of capital rounds as 
shown by Gompers (1995). The more research and development expense in a given industry, the greater 
the number of rounds. The standard deviation shows the wide range between ratios. The last indicator 
variable is the industry property, plant and equipment. This ratio also measures the tangibility of assets, 
Gompers (1995) and Tian (2011) have previously shown that tangibility decreases the number of capital 
rounds prior to an IPO. The average ratio is 0.295 and the standard deviation is 0.115. The range is far 
narrower than the range of the previous two industry measures. 
 
4. Empirical Model 
The empirical approach is initially aimed at understanding the variables that affect profitability of firms. 
Our approach is new in the sense that it allows for differentiated effects of firms’ profitability 
determinants depending on the type of firm. Moreover, firm type is unobserved and filtered from the 
data. Our dependent variable that captures profitability will be either  or . For the set of 
independent variables " we have the number of capital rounds (	), number of venture capitalists 
(
), the years between first round and IPO (), market value (), 	 and /
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2717453
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


 as described in detail in the data section. To model unobserved firm types in the determination 
of profitability we jointly estimate the following equations: 
 
# = %"&' + )#,'								if		- = "&. + )#,.									if		- = / (1) 
  
where  denotes the firm, " is the matrix of regressors and )#,0 for - = ,  is the error term. Notice 
that equations (1) capture differentiated marginal effects &' or &. of each of the elements of " on # 
depending on whether firms are of type- or type-.  
We estimate equations (1) via maximum likelihood under the assumptions that the each of the error 
terms follow a normal distribution, i.e., )#,0~2(0, 56,07 ). Then we can write the log-likelihood for the th 
firm as: 
 
ln ;# = ln < =#56,'√2@ expD−
)#,'7256,'7 F +
(1 − =#)
56,.√2@ expD−
)#,.7256,.7 FG (2) 
 
where the mixing parameter =# can be interpreted as the probability that firm  is in a regime dominated 
by type- firms. 
We can additionally model this probability to be a function of observable factors: 
 
=# = Prob(- = ) = (LM) (3) 
 
where L is the matrix of observable factors that includes the years between founding and the first round 
of VC capital (1	), the amount of money received in the first round (
	), and 
industry averages of the market-to-book ratio ( 	
	 ), research and development 
(	
	& ), and the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets (	
	!!). We 
expect the different variables in L to help us identify the firm type. M is the vector of coefficients to be 
estimated and (∙) is a function that we approximate using the logistic cumulative distribution function. 
Our mixture model of equations (1) and (3) is similar in flexibility to Gan and Hernandez (2013) who 
use mixtures to study hotels' spatial competition where collusive regimes are unobserved. Their model 
jointly estimates the price and occupancy rates, while in our setting we estimate a single profitability 
equation. Asymmetric information occurs in both models as hotels in Gan and Hernandez (2013) know 
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more than consumers about when collusion takes place. Likewise in our setting investors have less 
information than firms during an IPO.1 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Pooled Results 
As a first approach in the estimation of equation (1) we pool across all observations and assume 
&' = &.. The maximum likelihood estimates are reported in Table 2. Columns 1 through 3 have  as 
the dependent variable, while profitability is captured by  in columns 4 through 6. Moreover, 
different columns provide different specifications for the matrix of controls ". Across all columns the 
effect of 	
 on profitability is negative and highly statistically significant. This is consistent with 
previous work on IPOs. In particular, Jain and Kini (1995) also find a negative effects for VC backed IPOs. 
Moreover, Tian (2011) shows that the number of rounds has a negative effect on .2 This result 
provides some evidence that rationing capital is hampering the profitability of companies. Even though 
VCs need to monitor companies in order to minimize any potential pursuance of private benefits by the 
entrepreneurs, the costs of rationing capital are larger than the benefits of monitoring. Therefore, 
entrepreneurs are either focusing mostly on short term goals to guarantee the next round of capital or 
simply they do not have enough resources to focus on long term projects that will increase the 
profitability of the company.  
Consistent across all specifications that include the number of venture capitalists that participate in 
an IPO, we have that 
 also has a negative and statistically significant effect on profitability. While the 
effect is smaller in magnitude and marginally significant in columns 2 and 5, once we include our full set 
of regressors in " it is significant at the 1 percent level. This negative effect of syndication can be a signal 
that the seed capitalists only allow the participation of other VCs when there is a high degree of 
uncertainty about the company. Also, when several VCs fund a company they may be more interested in 
future growth rather than near profitability. This is consistent with Tian (2011) who finds a negative 
effect of syndication on the first year’s . However, Tian (2012) also finds that the effect of 
syndication on the average  after four years of an IPO is positive. 
From columns 3 and 6 we find that  has a positive and highly significant effect on  
and , which is in line with the findings of Tian (2011). He finds that the age of the firm also has a 
positive effect on	. Our  estimates shows that the longer the time a company spends 
                                                           
1
 While our methods are applied to VC, they can easily be extended to any IPO. 
2
 In addition, Jain and Kini (1994) indicate that the profitability of an IPO is negative in the short-term, which is 
consistent with the mean values of  and  in Table 1. 
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maturing, the more profitable it will become. We can explain this positive effect as a result from 
decreasing asymmetric information. It is reasonable to believe that as time passes by, information 
asymmetry between the venture capitalist and the company decreases. These companies were financed 
by seed VC firms that had little pressure to go public prematurely in order to raise capital from their 
partners for future projects. Through this patient financing process, companies were taken public after 
achieving a certain level of success. Therefore, we should expect higher  from a longer incubation 
period because these companies were probably already profitable prior to the IPO date. 
 
[Table 2, here] 
 
Turning to 	 we find that a positive and highly statistically significant coefficient. When 
comparing the point estimates from columns 3 and 6 we see that the magnitude of the effect of 	 
is larger when  is the dependent variable. In line with our results Nahata (2008) also finds that the 
reputation of the lead VC has a positive effect on the sales to book asset of the VC backed firm one year 
prior to the IPO and an even stronger effect on the year of the IPO.  
 
5. 2 Allowing for Differentiated Effects 
We now turn to the estimation of equations (1) when allowing for a differentiated effect from the 
variables in " on profitability. The maximum likelihood estimates using equation 2 are reported in Table 
3. We initially need to assess whether the two-type model represents an improvement from the pooled 
model. To do this we use the likelihood ratio test under the null that the pooled model represents a 
better fit. We find that the likelihood ratio statistic for  is 1792.02 while it is 1469.6 for . Both 
have an associated p-value of zero showing strong evidence against the null. Hence, we conclude that 
the two-type model represents an improvement in terms of model fit. Moreover, we also test if there 
are additional types using the null that the two-type model has a better fit when compared to a model 
with three-types. The likelihood ratio statistics for  and  are 8.984 and 6.976 respectively with 
the corresponding p-values being 0.254 and 0.431. We interpret this as strong evidence supporting the 
two-type model. 
Table 3 reports two separate columns for each model because the estimation endogenously 
separates each of the observations into one of two different groups. We have that 88.7% of the firms in 
the sample can be considered type- firms as the predicted probability of being type- is greater than 
0.5 (i.e., =# > 0.5). In terms of sign and magnitude the point estimates on 	
, 
, , 
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, and  for type- firms are consistent and very close to the pooled model. On the other hand 
the estimates show that group  firms are heavily influenced by the seed VC capitalization (	) 
with the magnitude of the estimates on 	 being about three times larger for type- firms. This 
difference shows that the reputation of the VC can have a huge impact on the profitability of an IPO. 
This could be because the seed VC can provide expertise to improve the operations of a company or that 
a VC with a strong reputation cherry-picks which company to finance amongst the several entrepreneurs 
looking for venture capital funds. 
 
[Table 3, here] 
 
Similar differentiated effects hold for /


. Interestingly for group  firms, the sign is 
positive and consistent with the pooled model. However while statistically significant, for group  firms 
the effect is negative. The negative effect of /


 on profitability for type- firms (with a 
point estimate of -0.881 for model 1) in the presence of a reputable VC can be interpreted as a long 
term investment that decreases profitability on the year of the IPO. For this group it would helpful to 
investors if they know the fixed assets required to operate in the industry and the seed VC. These two 
variables have a strong effect on the profitability of the company. A feasible explanation is that group  
companies have not made enough capital expenditures prior to the IPO but after the IPO, they have the 
necessary capital to make these investments but short term profitability decreases. This is consistent 
with post IPO monitoring by VCs that are concerned with the growth prospects of the company. The 
ratio of capital expenditures to assets for group  operates in the opposite direction. This suggests that 
when the seed VC is not as relevant, then other variables will have a greater effect. If the VC is not as 
strong as in group , then capital rounds, syndication, and market value have a negative effect. 
Incubation and capital expenditures have positive and significant coefficients, which can help overcome 
a weak VC.  
On the estimates for 	
 and 
 have a differentiated effect on profitability for different VC 
backed IPOs. We argue that for group , rounds do not have costs on profitability because a reputable 
VC has more experience in monitoring a company while limiting the costs of capital rationing. In terms 
of syndication, a VC with more experience may invite other VCs to participate in the IPO to improve the 
operations of the company but the negative effects on profitability disappear. Since our measure of VC 
reputation is based on long term market capitalization, it would be detrimental for the seed VC to invite 
other VCs only when the profitability of the company is uncertain. If the seed VC only invited other VCs 
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to invest if it is unsure about the company, it would be a signal of the weakness of the company. The 
differentiated effect we find on 	
 and 
 when comparing groups  and  from both models 1 
and 2 provide evidence that type- companies depend more on a reputable VC. This type of VCs do not 
need to grandstand and have less incentive to damage their reputation by inviting other VCs to invest 
only when there is a low probability of success. 
  
5. 3 Explaining the Differentiated Effects 
The estimates in Table 3 assume that the probability that a firm belongs to a particular group is fixed. 
We now relax this assumption and following equation 3 we allow the probability to depend on a 
particular set of observables L. As an initial approach the set of variables in L include the amount of 
money the VC received in the first year (
	) and the number of year prior to the first round of 
money (1	). Previous literature on VC does not consider these variables as right-hand-side 
regressors in equation 1, but rather as variables that affect the number of capital rounds (Tian, 2011). As 
such we expect these variables in L to be correlated with information about the company that is 
available to investors and that is correlated with unobservables that determine the type of VC. The 
maximum likelihood estimates are presented in Table 4. 
 
[Table 4, here] 
 
Consistent across both models in Table 4, the marginal effect of the variables in " on profitability 
are very close to the results in Table 3. For the estimates of M in equation 3 we observe that both 
specifications find that 
	  is not statistically significant. Moreover, 1	  is 
statistically significant at at least 1% level. This positive estimate indicates that the longer the firm waits 
for the first round of funding by a VC, the more likely it is to be a type- firm. For example, firms that 
wait very little for the first round of funding are more likely to be type-, hence the number of rounds 
(	
) is more likely to have no statistically significant effect on profitability. 
 
[Table 5, here] 
Table 5 models L by additionally including three industry averages calculated previously in Gompers 
(1995) and Tian (2011). Consistent across both of the models in the table, the average market value to 
book value of equity has no statistically significant effect. Moreover research and development also is 
not statistically significant. Only the industry average ratio of property, plant and equipment to assets is 
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statistically significant and has a positive effect on the probability of being type-. This positive effect 
means that if the company belongs to an industry with particularly large values for property, plant and 
equipment (relative to assets) this company is more likely to be in group . Likewise, 	
 and 
 
are more likely to have no effect on profitability for companies that come from industries with lower 
levels of expenditures on property, plant and equipment. A firm from group  may suffer short term 
profitability in the IPO year from an increase in capital expenditures. However, since it belongs to an 
industry with low tangible assets it might not be necessary to spend in property, plant, and equipment. 
Also supporting the statistical significance of 	
	!! on the probability equation, we have that 
the tangibility of assets decreases the information asymmetries because the venture capitalists can keep 
the fixed assets in case of liquidation. The amount of fixed assets decrease the number of venture 
capital rounds (Gompers, 1995; Tian, 2011). In addition, an increase in capital rounds can decrease the 
profitability of a company by limiting the amount of capital available. If information asymmetries are too 
high, rounds can help monitor the entrepreneur and limit him from pursuing private benefits. Therefore, 
if there is a high amount of tangibility of assets, then rounds have more costs than benefits because 
there are less deleterious effects from information asymmetry. Finally, 1	 and 
 
have qualitatively the same effects as in Table 4. For the differentiated marginal effect of " on 
profitability across groups, the estimates in Table 5 appear very close to the estimates in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
5.4 Continuous Types 
The estimation of equations 1 and 3 along with the interpretation of the results has focused on the 
existence of two types of companies. This interpretation is based on an implicit threshold of 0.5 in the 
probability of being of a particular type (e.g., being type-). Notice that the probability =# of being of a 
particular type is a continuum that goes from zero to one. An alternative interpretation of the results in 
Tables 3 through 5 is that there exists a continuum of types that fall in between group  and group . 
That is, for each company in the sample the profitability determinants " will be a linear combination of 
the marginal effects of groups  and . More formally, the marginal effects of " on profitability for firm 
 are given by &# = =#&' + (1 − =#)&.. The probability =# is specific to the company and it is determined 
by the fitted values from equation 3 for each firm given its firm characteristics as captured in L. Because 
different firms are expected to have different values for =#, hence our alternative interpretation of a 
continuum of types. 
Figure 1 shows the histogram of the fitted values =O# for the companies in the sample using the 
specification of model 1 in Table 5. As before, these fitted values are interpreted as the probability that 
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firm  is in group . If we set a threshold of 0.5 (i.e., =O# > 0.5), we have that 77.7% of the firms belong to 
group A. Figure 1 illustrates how most of the firms are closer to group , meaning that the marginal 
effects on profitability put a relatively heavier weight on the estimates  of group . If investors are not 
aware of the observables in L and given that it is more likely that a firm will belong to group , then 
consistent with the estimates of the pooled model investors will expect a positive effect on profitability 
from /


 and to a lower extent the reputation of the seed VC. The length of the incubation 
should also have a positive effect on profitability. 	
, 
, and  will most likely decrease the 
profitability of the IPO. 
 
[Figure 1, here] 
 
However, if an investor proceeds to use the observables in L and infers on the type of firm ( or  
or a linear combination of  and ) then the investor can have a more accurate assessment of the IPOs 
and the determinants of its profitability. If the investor can identify the firms that belong to group , 
then he will know that the reputation of the seed VC will have a high positive effect on profitability and 
that the ratio of capital expenditures to assets will have the opposite effect on . On the other hand, 
if an investor fails to use the information in L and uses the pooled model for investment decisions, the 
investor may not be able to accurately identify a group  company. Hence investment decisions based 
on 	
 or 
 will be suboptimal. 
 
5.5 Implications 
Our empirical results have implications at various levels. Using data from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission investors can use the estimates of equations (1) to predict first year profitability of VC 
backed IPOs to guide their investment decisions. Given the high demand for IPOs by institutional 
investors, it is quite useful to distinguish indicators of a firm’s future profitability. Furthermore if other 
investors are hesitant about investing on IPOs, our mixture approach should be helpful in reducing 
existing asymmetric information. Therefore, a wider and more diverse pool of investors should decrease 
the cost of capital for newly public companies. Other avenue for acquiring IPOs is through Exchange 
Traded Funds (ETF) such as the Renaissance Capital IPO. If the average investor can estimate with more 
certainty the profitability of a company, then there should be more investors willing to acquire ETFs. 
The same estimates can also be used by investment banks to guide IPO initial pricing decisions 
and by firms themselves to decrease underpricing. If investment banks purposely underprice an IPO to 
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decrease the probability of litigation after the IPO, they will be more comfortable providing a more 
accurate price if they can better determine the profitability of a stock after the IPO. If an established VC 
can limit the underpricing problem and enhance the profitability of the firm, then investors will benefit 
from a lower volatility in the price of the stock after the IPO. The new company will have a lower 
litigation risk if the investor does not experience a sharp wealth decline. The litigation procedures after 
Facebook’s IPO are a good example of the information asymmetry between the firm and investors. 
Shareholders argue that Facebook and Morgan Stanley hid information about future growth prospects.  
If investors have better indicators of a firm’s future profitability, then there will be less information 
asymmetries and lower litigation risk not only for the company but also for the underwriter. Additional 
cases where shareholders believe that the company tried to influence investors are Google and 
Salesforce.com in 2004. In both IPOs managers violated the going public process and provided 
information that was not included in the S-1. Because our methodology identifies the factors that 
enhance the performance of the IPO, the firm will be less susceptible to frivolous lawsuits if 
shareholders identify these factors and invest accordingly. If the SEC wants to avoid litigation after the 
IPO, it can include more information in the S-1 that can help investors determine what factors will have 
a greater effect on a VC backed firm.  
If a reputable VC continues to monitor the performance of the firm after the IPO, then there will be 
lower probability of a decline in shareholders wealth due to mismanagement. To decrease litigation risk, 
the SEC can encourage investing in firms backed by reputable VCs or encourage new VCs to continue 
monitoring the firm even after the IPO.  If investors identify the firms that increase their profitability due 
to having the financial support of a reputable VC, then the demand for reputable VC backed IPOs should 
increase. Less reputable VCs will then have more pressure to do IPOs with mature firms and to continue 
monitoring them after the IPO. 
In addition to the typical prediction of profitability, the benefit in the estimation of the system of 
equations (1) and (3) is that profitability determinants change by the type of firm and that firm type can 
also be predicted. The implications regarding reducing asymmetric information can be generalized to 
other markets as the use of mixture methods can serve to help identify different market equilibria that 
correspond to differentiated types of market participants.3 Reducing asymmetric information in markets 
can also help mitigate problems associated with asymmetric information (i.e., adverse selection and 
moral hazard). 
                                                           
3
 The mixture methods employed are very flexible and contingent on obtaining appropriate data they can also be 
applied to other markets where asymmetric information exists. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper proposes new methods to model multiple equilibria and heterogeneous VC backed 
companies to assess the determinants of profitability (i.e., ROA and ROE) and reduce asymmetric 
information. In addition, our methods account for potential unobservable factors that separate IPOs into 
differentiated groups. Differentiation of firms is determined endogenously by the data with different 
groups having differentiated effects of the factors that affect first year profitability. After separating the 
VC backed IPOs into groups, we observe that the reputation of the seed venture capitalist is an 
important factor affecting the profitability of a small group of firms (group ). For this same group, an 
increase in capital expenditures decreases the return on assets. On the other hand for a larger group of 
firms (group ), profitability is also influenced by the reputation of the seed venture capitalist but its 
effect is much smaller. Interestingly, for group   companies capital expenditures operate in the 
opposite direction. For both groups of companies a longer period between the first round of VC capital 
and the IPO has a positive impact on profitability (as captured by ROA).  
Our approach also models the probability of a firm belonging to a particular group. Our maximum 
likelihood estimates show that the average tangibility of assets in the industry where the company 
operates is one key separating factor explaining the differentiated effects on profitability. We also 
extend the interpretation to a continuum of types that allows us to more accurately capture the 
heterogeneity across VC backed companies. 
The benefit of our proposed methods is that investors have more information to assess the 
profitability of a company in its IPO year. Tian (2011) is mostly concerned with the effects of the 
interaction between capital rounds and distance on a firm’s profitability. However, because his 
approach involves a pooled regression model, the particular source of unobserved heterogeneity and 
asymmetric information that we modeled in the IPOs is not taken into account. By incorporating factors 
that are observable prior to the IPO, the investor can differentiate across otherwise unobserved 
heterogeneous companies. This should increase the investor's information set and help him evaluate 
more accurately what variables are key determinants of the profitability of an IPO.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables obs mean sd min max 
       2,404 -0.122 0.361 -7.658 0.584  2,397 -0.171 0.459 -1.552 0.359 	
 2,404 4.879 3.132 1 24 
 2,404 6.340 5.008 1 37  2,404 4.467 3.536 0 37 	 2,404 0.0582 0.100 3.25e-05 0.814  2,404 4.168e+08 1.102e+09 2.058e+06 2.422e+10 /


 2,387 0.0740 0.0901 -0.00280 0.945 1	 2,396 4.862 10.97 0 113 
	 2,338 7.949e+09 8.050e+10 1,000,000 3.760e+12 	
	 2,402 2,868 57,803 0.713 2.161e+06 	
	&  2,378 24.15 341.6 5.05e-10 14,401 	
	!! 2,403 0.295 0.115 0.0433 0.750 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics of venture capital backed IPOs between 1980 
and 2012.  is measured as net income including extraordinary items divided by total assets 
on the year of the IPO,  is net income including extraordinary items divided by total book 
value of equity on the year of the IPO, 	
 is the number of venture capital rounds that 
the company receives, 
  are the number of venture capitalists that finance a company,  is the number of years between the first capital round and the IPO date, 	 is 
the aggregate market value of all firms taken public by the seed VC from 1980 to the year of 
the first round divided by the aggregate market value of all VC backed IPOs during the same 
period,  is the market value at the IPO date, /


 equals the company’s capital 
expenditures divided by its total assets on the year of the IPO, 1	 is the number of 
years between the funding and the year when the first round of VC money was received, 
	 is the dollar amount received during the first capital round, 	
	 is 
the average industry market-to-book ratio measured as the market value of equity divided by 
book value of equity, 	
	&  is the average industry research and development to total 
assets, and 	
	!! is the average ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets. 
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Table 2. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Pooled Model 
Dependent variable:   
 
  
Variables in ": (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       	
 -0.0119*** -0.00841*** -0.0125*** -0.0179*** -0.0126*** -0.0183*** 
 (0.00234) (0.00301) (0.00314) (0.00297) (0.00383) (0.00396) 
  -0.00343* -0.00653***  -0.00518** -0.00967*** 
  (0.00188) (0.00194)  (0.00240) (0.00244)    0.0129***   0.0175*** 
   (0.00224)   (0.00282) 	   0.472***   0.702*** 
   (0.0753)   (0.0948)    -2.00e-11***   -2.72e-11*** 
   (6.68e-12)   (8.42e-12) /


   -0.156*   -0.341*** 
   (0.0811)   (0.102) 
Constant -0.0642*** -0.0594*** -0.0855*** -0.0842*** -0.0769*** -0.103*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0138) (0.0167) (0.0172) (0.0175) (0.0210) 
       5 -1.025*** -1.026*** -1.043*** -0.787*** -0.788*** -0.813*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0145) 
       
Observations 2,404 2,404 2,387 2,397 2,397 2,380 
Log Likelihood -946.1 -944.4 -897.3 -1515 -1512 -1443 
Notes: This table shows MLE estimates of the pooled model. The dependent variable is  in columns 1 through 3 
and  in columns 4 through 6. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively. Our sample includes venture capital backed IPOs between 1980 and 2012. Definitions of all 
variables are explained in the notes of Table 1. 
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Table 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Mixture Model 
Dependent variable: ROA ROE 
Model: (1) (2) 
 
  
Variables in ": Group A Group B Group A Group B 
     	
 -0.00968*** -0.00409 -0.0126*** 0.00358 
 (0.00174) (0.0163) (0.00222) (0.0133) 
 -0.00662*** 0.00380 -0.00811*** 0.00623 
 (0.00103) (0.00961) (0.00135) (0.00746)  0.0108*** -0.00111 0.0136*** 0.00167 
 (0.00119) (0.0111) (0.00157) (0.0100) 	 0.306*** 0.926** 0.386*** 1.165*** 
 (0.0379) (0.416) (0.0516) (0.299)  -1.50e-11*** -8.06e-11 -3.59e-11*** 1.33e-11 
 (3.25e-12) (5.44e-11) (6.45e-12) (1.69e-11) /


 0.140*** -0.881** 0.247*** -1.206*** 
 (0.0423) (0.378) (0.0551) (0.286) 
Constant -0.0153* -0.530*** 0.0264** -0.866*** 
 (0.00879) (0.104) (0.0117) (0.101) 
     5 -1.877*** -0.478*** -1.652*** -0.693*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0419) (0.0265) (0.0436) 
     
Observations 2,387 2,380 
   
Log Likelihood -1.288 -708.2 
Notes: This table shows MLE estimates of the mixture model. The dependent variable is  (model 1) and   (model 2). Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. Our sample includes venture capital backed IPOs between 1980 and 2012. Definitions of all 
variables are explained in the notes of Table 1. 
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Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Mixture Model 
Dependent variable: ROA ROE 
Model: (1) (2) 
 
  
Variables in ": Group A Group B Group A Group B 
     	
 -0.00944*** -0.00146 -0.0123*** -0.00628 
 (0.00180) (0.0132) (0.00222) (0.0122) 
 -0.00579*** 0.00359 -0.00689*** 0.00439 
 (0.00104) (0.00782) (0.00137) (0.00673)  0.00981*** 0.0132 0.0127*** 0.0167* 
 (0.00122) (0.0110) (0.00157) (0.00957) 	 0.273*** 0.912*** 0.335*** 1.186*** 
 (0.0380) (0.345) (0.0513) (0.268)  -3.32e-11*** 5.65e-12 -7.39e-11*** 2.67e-11** 
 (6.93e-12) (1.65e-11) (1.37e-11) (1.21e-11) /


 0.150*** -0.817** 0.258*** -1.371*** 
 (0.0423) (0.330) (0.0552) (0.272) 
Constant 0.00173 -0.576*** 0.0490*** -0.757*** 
 (0.00941) (0.0849) (0.0123) (0.0842) 
     5 -1.964*** -0.546*** -1.723*** -0.678*** 
 (0.0380) (0.0421) (0.0286) (0.0338) 
     
Variables in L: 
   1	 0.105*** 0.0887*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0154) 
	 -5.97e-13 -1.66e-12 
 (3.50e-12) (1.51e-12) 
Constant 1.060*** 0.792*** 
 (0.134) (0.107) 
     
Observations 2,315 2,308 
   
Log Likelihood 31.01 -640.3 
Notes: This table shows MLE estimates of the mixture model. The indicator factors are Year 1 Round and 
First Money. The dependent variable is  in model 1 and   in model 2. Figures in parentheses are 
standard errors. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Our sample includes venture capital 
backed IPOs between 1980 and 2012. Definitions of all variables are explained in the notes of Table 1. 
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Table 5. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Mixture Model 
Dependent variable: ROA ROE 
Model: (1) (2) 
 
  
Variables in ": Group A Group B Group A Group B 
     	
 -0.00705*** -0.00754 -0.0118*** -0.0105 
 (0.00166) (0.00956) (0.00219) (0.0111) 
 -0.00380*** 0.000372 -0.00600*** 0.00266 
 (0.00102) (0.00564) (0.00134) (0.00616)  0.00749*** 0.0148* 0.0120*** 0.0152* 
 (0.00117) (0.00810) (0.00155) (0.00881) 	 0.193*** 0.758*** 0.301*** 1.123*** 
 (0.0356) (0.274) (0.0494) (0.265)  -6.32e-11*** 1.35e-11 -8.99e-11*** 2.84e-11** 
 (7.41e-12) (1.13e-11) (1.25e-11) (1.15e-11) /


 0.118*** -1.104*** 0.227*** -1.693*** 
 (0.0377) (0.266) (0.0546) (0.263) 
Constant 0.0273*** -0.414*** 0.0626*** -0.637*** 
 (0.00887) (0.0629) (0.0116) (0.0738) 
     5 -2.152*** -0.674*** -1.769*** -0.689*** 
 (0.0546) (0.0377) (0.0281) (0.0307) 
     
Variables in L: 
   1	 0.118*** 0.0942*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0157) 
	 -1.19e-12 -2.04e-12 
 (4.23e-12) (1.30e-12) 	
	 3.24e-06 3.23e-06 
 (3.02e-06) (3.12e-06) 	
	&  -0.000367 -0.000601 
 (0.000472) (0.000452) 	
	!! 6.978*** 5.226*** 
 (0.823) (0.707) 
Constant -1.391*** -0.829*** 
 (0.273) (0.230) 
     
Observations 2,315 2,308 
   
Log Likelihood 31.01 -640.3 
Notes: This table shows MLE estimates of the mixture model. The dependent variable is  in model 1 and   in model 2. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. Our sample includes venture capital backed IPOs between 1980 and 2012. Definitions of all 
variables are explained in the notes of Table 1. 
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Figure 1. Probability of being in Group A 
 
  Notes: Estimated based on Model 1, Table 5. 
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